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“PROFIT, PEOPLE, PLANET” PERVERTED: 
HOLDING BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
ACCOUNTABLE TO INTENDED 
BENEFICIARIES 
Abstract: For-profit social entrepreneurship is a steadily growing movement. As 
part of this movement, numerous states have enacted legislation authorizing the 
incorporation of benefit corporations, a new for-profit corporate form. In addition 
to generating profit for shareholders, benefit corporations must “create” a “public 
benefit.” The mandate that a for-profit corporation pursue a humanitarian cause 
in addition to generating profit is a significant departure from shareholder prima-
cy: the maxim that the sole purpose of a corporation is to generate return on in-
vestment for its shareholders. Although this legislation is a necessary and pro-
gressive evolution in corporate law, the current benefit corporation form lacks 
meaningful accountability and oversight mechanisms. It does little to deter bad 
actors from taking advantage of socially conscious consumers willing to pay a 
premium for ethically sourced goods and services by incorporating and operating 
sham benefit corporations. This Note argues for amending benefit corporation 
legislation to allow state attorneys general to oversee the creation of public bene-
fits. An oversight and enforcement mechanism would root out and deter bad ac-
tors from perverting the purpose of the benefit corporation form, and it would 
hold benefit corporations accountable to their intended beneficiaries. 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2015, Kickstarter, a for-profit crowdfunding website, rein-
corporated from a traditional corporation to a benefit corporation.1 Kickstarter 
provides entrepreneurs with a platform to raise money from investors around 
the world.2 The company’s charter states that “[w]e measure our success as a 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Mike Isaac & David Gelles, Kickstarter Focuses Its Mission on Altruism Over Profit, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/technology/kickstarters-altruistic-vision-
profits-as-the-means-not-the-mission.html [https://perma.cc/HP9X-ZTXD] (discussing Kickstarter’s 
reincorporation as a benefit corporation); Yancey Strickler et al., Kickstarter Is Now a Benefit Corpo-
ration, KICKSTARTER BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-is-now-a-
benefit-corporation [https://perma.cc/B3UV-5YRW] (announcing Kickstarter’s reincorporation as a 
Delaware public benefit corporation and its pledge to donate 5% of post-tax profits to organizations 
promoting the arts and combating inequality). See generally William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. 
Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 819 (2012) (describing the difference between benefit corporations and other cor-
porations). 
 2 See About, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/about [https://perma.cc/CU76-SKC5] 
(describing how Kickstarter works). 
1748 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1747 
company by how well we achieve [our] mission, not by the size of our prof-
its.”3 By reincorporating as a benefit corporations, Kickstarter’s founders 
sought to “reject[] business as usual, and the pursuit of profit above all.”4 
Echoing the tone of Kickstarter’s founders, beginning with Maryland in 
2010, more than half the states enacted legislation authorizing the incorpora-
tion of a new form of for-profit business corporation known generally as a 
benefit corporation.5 Benefit corporations exist not only to maximize share-
holder profit but also to pursue and create benefits for public, non-corporate 
stakeholders—intended beneficiaries.6 Specifically, a benefit corporation must 
include in its certificate of incorporation that its purpose is to “create” a “gen-
                                                                                                                           
 3 Charter, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/charter [https://perma.cc/8AQZ-YL4E] 
(alteration in original). The company’s mission is “to help bring creative projects to life, and [to] con-
nect people around creative projects and the creative process.” Id. (alteration in original). 
 4 Strickler et al., supra note 1 (alteration in original). 
 5 See Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mecha-
nisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 170, 171 (2012) 
(noting that Maryland was the first state to pass benefit corporation legislation); J. Haskell Murray, 
Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
345, 348 (2014) [hereinafter Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation] (noting that approximately half 
the states have passed benefit corporation legislation); State by State Status of Legislation, B CORP., 
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/HK9G-C3HP] (collecting 
state-by-state information on benefit corporation legislation, either passed or pending). States use 
different nomenclature for their benefit corporations, but the basic legislation itself is generally quite 
similar. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 361 (2016) (naming Delaware’s corporate form a “public 
benefit corporation”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-2 (2011), http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/ 
Vol08_Ch0401-0429/HRS0420D/HRS_0420D-0002.htm [https://perma.cc/8H4W-7226]. 
 (naming Hawaii’s benefit corporate form a “sustainable business corporation”); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 156E, § 1 (2014) (naming the Massachusetts version simply a “[b]enefit [c]orporation”). In addi-
tion to their benefit corporation statutes, California, Florida, and Washington also enacted statutes 
authorizing the incorporation of “social purpose corporations” or “flexible purpose corporations,” 
which are similar to benefit corporations but are not required to pursue a “general” public benefit, are 
not required to consider the various stakeholders listed in the benefit corporation statute, and are not 
required to be assessed against a third-party standard. See J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Mas-
ter: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 24 
(2012) [hereinafter Murray, Choose Your Own Master] (describing the differences between various 
social purpose business entities); cf. YVON CHOUINARD, LET MY PEOPLE GO SURFING: THE EDUCA-
TION OF A RELUCTANT BUSINESSMAN 3 (2006) (“[B]usiness can produce food, cure disease, control 
population, employ people, and generally enrich our lives. And it can do these good things and make a 
profit, without losing its soul.”). 
 6 Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 838–39 (explaining how the benefit corporation form bucks 
the “paradigm of shareholder primacy”). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, corporations were 
formed by special acts of state legislatures, or in rare instances by Congress, and were chartered only for 
specific, usually public purposes. LINDA O. SMIDDY, SODERQUIST ON CORPORATE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 1:2.1 (4th ed. 2012). Benefit corporations harken back to the earlier era in corporate law be-
cause the statutes require that these corporations are incorporated, at least in part, for a specific, gen-
erally public purpose. Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit 
Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 272, 276–77 (2013) (reflecting on early corporate law and noting 
that benefit corporations “represent a return to early practices as well as a seeming ultra-modern inno-
vation in corporate form”). 
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eral public benefit.”7 Benefit corporations may also identify the creation of 
“specific public benefits.”8 
The benefit corporation was designed around the proposition that for-
profit entities can and should be used to make progressive social and environ-
mental contributions.9 Indeed, corporations can wield immense power and 
should be encouraged to act responsibly and improve society, instead of simply 
operating to enlarge their bottom lines.10 To deter passivity in this lofty mis-
sion, however, benefit corporation legislation must be written in a way that 
encourages and sustains humanitarian activity, and include mechanisms to hold 
accountable those corporations that fail to follow through on their promises.11 
Holding corporations accountable, in the normal model, generally occurs 
in two ways: (1) if the entity is a for-profit corporation, directors are brought to 
task through a derivative suit commenced by the shareholders; and (2) if the 
entity is a nonprofit organization, directors or trustees are held accountable 
                                                                                                                           
 7 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 201(a) (BENEFIT CORP. 2014), http://benefitcorp.net/
sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL9E-AWZE]; 
see J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 549 (2016) (calling 
this provision the “centerpiece” of benefit corporation legislation). A certificate of incorporation is a 
document issued by a state authority that grants a corporation its legal existence, the right to function 
as a corporation, and sets forth the basic terms of the corporation, including the number and classes of 
shares and the purpose of the corporation. Articles of Incorporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). 
 8 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 201(b). 
 9 See Benefit Corporation White Paper, 68 BUS. LAW. 1083, 1083–84 (2013) (explaining that 
benefit corporations allow for-profit corporate entities to pursue humanitarian causes without incur-
ring liability to shareholders); Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate 
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1009–10 (2013) (describing the benefit corporation form against the 
backdrop of shareholder primacy and noting that benefit corporations have an “ambitious” mission); 
see also Kennan El Khatib, The Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 156 (2015) 
(stating that the benefit corporation “broke new ground” by allowing directors to take into account 
non-financial stakeholders); Munch, supra note 5, at 171, 175 (calling the benefit corporation the 
“most ascendant social enterprise innovation today” and noting that the benefit corporation helped 
socially entrepreneurs “escape the for-profit or nonprofit binary”). 
 10 See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS & PRO-
GRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 124, 125 (2006) (proposing a shift in corporate law to promote the use of 
corporations as a tool for progressive change); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct That Does 
Not Maximize Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Sheep’s Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1, 
19 (1998) (arguing that nonmaximizing corporate activities should nonetheless be promoted because 
such activities can still lead to profit); see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social 
Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 683–84 (2013) (noting that the benefit corporation movement is based 
on the idea that corporations can make social change, but arguing that “[f]or a specialized legal form 
to succeed, it must permit social entrepreneurs to embrace this different ideal”). See generally Kent 
Greenfield & Gordon Smith, Debate: Saving the World with Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J. 947 
(2007) (debating whether corporate law can be used as a tool for social progress). 
 11 See Mitch Nass, Note, The Viability of Benefit Corporations: An Argument for Greater Trans-
parency and Accountability, 39 J. CORP. L. 875, 881 (2014) (arguing that “if benefit corporations are 
to become a viable corporate form . . . it will be the third-party transparency requirement coupled with 
stringent enforcement mechanisms that will drive this success”). 
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through legal actions brought by a state attorney general.12 Under the current 
benefit corporation model, however, intended beneficiaries are explicitly de-
nied standing to enforce the creation of a public benefit, both in the courts and 
in benefit corporations’ internal processes.13 In addition, as will be discussed, 
even shareholders themselves have limited remedies to enforce the creation of 
a public benefit.14 Because benefit corporations are for-profit entities and do 
not receive any unique tax advantages, it is unlikely that, under the current 
model, state attorneys general would have any power to intervene in a benefit 
corporation’s internal affairs.15 
Accordingly, this Note argues that although the benefit corporation 
movement represents a progressive evolution in corporate law, the current 
form lacks accountability and enforcement mechanisms necessary to make it a 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 109–116 and accompanying text (describing state attorneys general’s mandate 
to hold nonprofit organizations accountable to the public). 
 13 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14622(d) (West 2012) (“An officer shall not have a fiduciary 
duty to a person that is a beneficiary of the general or specific public benefit purposes of a benefit 
corporation arising from the status of the person as a beneficiary.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) 
(2016) (denying standing to intended beneficiaries and stating that directors of benefit corporations do 
not owe a fiduciary duty to “any person on account of any interest of such person in the public benefit or 
public benefits”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 10(e) (same); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3321(d) (2014) 
(denying standing to intended beneficiaries); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(e) (2016) (same); 
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(d) (same); Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 850 (dis-
cussing the fact that benefit corporation legislation denies standing to intended beneficiaries); Gil Lan, 
Benefit Corporations: A Persisting and Heightened Conflict for Directors, 21 J.L. BUS. & ETH. 113, 
116 (2015) (same). Standing is a jurisdictional matter that pertains to the power of a court to hear and 
decide an issue. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The requirement of standing guarantees 
that every claimant “is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.” Id. at 518. The 
general requirement for Article III standing under the U.S. Constitution is that the moving party has 
personally suffered an “injury in fact,” which is causally related to the litigated issue. See, e.g., 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016) (setting forth that to 
establish standing, a “plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial deci-
sion”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570–71 (1992) (holding that plaintiffs did not 
suffer an “injury in fact” in suit brought by environmental groups alleging that federally-funded activi-
ties harmed certain species). 
 14 See infra notes 71–97 and accompanying text (discussing the accountability mechanisms in 
benefit corporation legislation). 
 15 Dana Brakman Reiser, Regulating Social Enterprise, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 231, 240 (2014) 
(arguing that “investor-only accountability” in benefit corporation legislation is “suboptimal”); Nass, 
supra note 11, at 886 (noting the limited availability of enforcement mechanisms outside the purview 
of shareholders); FAQ, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/faq [https://perma.cc/J6YK-GR47] 
[hereinafter Benefit Corp FAQ’s] (noting that benefit corporations are taxed as C or S corps). This is in 
contrast to nonprofit charitable organizations, the missions of which can be enforced by state attorneys 
general, either by statutory or common law power. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (West 1980) 
(providing standing to attorney general to initiate suit for enforcement of the activities of charitable 
trusts); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 14.251(1) (West 2016) (same); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. 
LAW § 112(a) (McKinney 2016) (same); Joshua B. Nix, The Things People Do When No One Is Look-
ing: An Argument for the Expansion of Standing in the Charitable Sector, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 
147, 167 (2005) (stating that state attorneys general have standing to oversee nonprofits). 
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worthwhile contribution to the law.16 Part I provides an overview of the social-
ly conscious consumer and investor trend, the resultant introduction of benefit 
corporation legislation, and explores the concept of “greenwashing.”17 Part II 
discusses the benefit corporation within broader corporate law, introduces the 
enforcement and accountability mechanisms in the current benefit corporation 
form, and compares these mechanisms to the law governing nonprofit organi-
zations.18 Part III argues that the existing legislative framework fails to ade-
quately protect the interests of intended beneficiaries, and advocates for the 
addition of state attorney general oversight modeled in part after the United 
Kingdom’s Community Interest Company.19 
I. THE BENEFIT CORPORATION MOVEMENT 
The benefit corporation developed within an environment of public distrust 
of large corporations and a rejection of shareholder primacy by entrepreneurs 
and investors.20 This Part outlines the socially conscious consumer and investor 
trend and the introduction of benefit corporation legislation.21 Section A discuss-
es the conflict between shareholder primacy and corporate social responsibility 
and provides an overview of the benefit corporation movement.22 Section B ex-
plores the issue of “greenwashing” in the benefit corporation context.23 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra notes 71–97, 133–174 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 20–53 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 54–128 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 133–174 and accompanying text. 
 20 See Alissa Mickels, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a For-
Benefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 271, 272 (2009) (noting that “maximization of monetary wealth for enterprise owners 
as the utmost goal, has widely been criticized as a practice fostering such things as global warming, 
human rights abuse and labor violations”); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 5, at 3 (de-
scribing the fact that in recent years, stories of corporate wrong-doing have been commonplace); Mark 
J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 539, 541 (2011) (discussing the role that AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers played in 
causing the financial crisis of 2008); Frank Newport, Americans Similarly Dissatisfied with Corpora-
tions, Gov’t, GALLUP (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159875/americans-similarly-
dissatisfied-corporations-gov.aspx [https://perma.cc/74X7-BLQ3] (finding that “[m]ore than 60% of 
Americans are dissatisfied with the size and power or influence of major corporations”). 
 21 See infra notes 24–53 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 24–40 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 41–53 and accompanying text. 
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A. Can Corporations Be Humanitarians? Rethinking Corporate Purpose 
and the Development of the Benefit Corporation 
Corporate purpose is without a doubt the most salient distinction between 
benefit corporations and traditional corporations.24 For much of corporate 
law’s history, a blunt dichotomy existed between for-profit and nonprofit enti-
ties.25 This was due in part to over-application of the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s 1919 holding in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., where, in dictum, the court 
famously wrote that for-profit corporations are organized and operated exclu-
sively for the benefit of their shareholders and directors must ensure that their 
actions put shareholder profit ahead of other competing interests.26 This is re-
garded as the shareholder primacy theory of corporate law and it has dominat-
ed discussions of corporate law for most of the past century.27 Thus, prior to 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Frederick Alexander, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: Widening the Fiduciary Aperture 
to Broaden the Corporate Mission, 29 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 66, 68 (2016); see Johnson, supra note 
6, at 282–93 (discussing corporate purpose and the benefit corporation’s unique mission). 
 25 See Munch, supra note 5, at 175 (describing how the benefit corporation provided entrepre-
neurs with a different option, as opposed to the conventional choice between for-profit and nonprofit 
entities); J.P. MORGAN GLOBAL RESEARCH, IMPACT INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET CLASS 5 
(2010), http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/finance/publications/JPMorgan%20II%20Report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/M6ZL-NJEK] [hereinafter J.P. MORGAN GLOBAL RESEARCH] (explaining that in years past, inves-
tors faced a “binary” choice between investing for profit and donating to charity). But see Kent Green-
field, A Skeptic’s View of Benefit Corporations, 1 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY 
REV. 17, 18 (2014) (arguing that the current benefit corporation form does not “add much” to corpo-
rate law). 
 26 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primari-
ly for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”); see 
William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a Champion: The 
Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton’s Vision of the Corporate Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1383, 1385 n.7 
(2005) (noting that the Dodge decision “was atavistic even at its date of publication”). 
 27 See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 4, 11, 25–27 (2012) (discussing and 
arguing against shareholder primacy); Milton Friedman, Opinion, The Social Responsibility of Busi-
ness Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at A17 (arguing that the only reason corpo-
rations exist is to maximize shareholder value). But see generally Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the 
Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101 (1979) (noting that corporate law allows directors to take into 
account the interests of all affected constituencies). The debate over shareholder primacy dates back to 
at least the early 1930s and the famous Berle-Dodd debate captured in the Harvard Law Review. See 
C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for 
the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 78–79 (2002) (stating that the Berle-Dodd debate 
was “the first clear debate over corporate social responsibility”). Compare A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate 
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (arguing “that all powers granted to 
a corporation or to the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable 
only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders”), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corpo-
rate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148, 1156 (1932) (disputing the notion that cor-
porations exist purely for profit and arguing that corporate managers could actually increase profits by 
focusing on other constituencies, thereby garnering public goodwill). In 2010, the Delaware Chancery 
Court reiterated the idea of shareholder primacy in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark. See 16 
A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). In that case, the court held that Craigslist, a for-profit Delaware corpora-
tion, could not enact a number of defensive measures designed to restrict the influence of eBay, a 
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the benefit corporation movement, there was trepidation that “the ‘special at-
tributes’ of businesses that pursued both financial and social missions were 
‘likely to be fragile and easy to disrupt or destroy’” in large, particularly public 
corporations.28 This is because shareholder primacy rejects the proposition that 
corporate directors can divert revenue to purposes other than creating mone-
tary gain for shareholders.29 
The conflict between social entrepreneurship and shareholder primacy 
was anecdotally demonstrated when, in 2000, the conglomerate Unilever ac-
quired Ben & Jerry’s, a quintessential environmentally conscious business.30 
Some commentators, including the founders of Ben & Jerry’s themselves, ar-
gued that corporate law required the board of directors to accept an offer to sell 
the company because to do otherwise would result in shareholder liability.31 
                                                                                                                           
minority stockholder. Id. at 6. The court noted that Craigslist “largely operates its business as a com-
munity service” and “does not expend any great effort seeking to maximize its profits.” Id. at 7–8. The 
court further stated that directors of a for-profit Delaware corporation could not implement a business 
strategy that “openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization—at least not consistently with the 
directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law.” Id. at 35. Despite the court’s strong language about 
shareholder primacy, a colorable argument could be made that the case should be constrained to its 
somewhat unique minority shareholder oppression fact pattern. See J. Haskell Murray, Defending 
Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 493 
(2013) (noting that academics have criticized eBay for this reason). 
 28 Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a 
Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 231 (2010) (quoting James E. Austin & Herman B. Leonard, 
Can the Virtuous Mouse and the Wealthy Elephant Live Happily Ever After?, 51 CAL. MGMT. REV. 77, 
79 (2008)); see also J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit Cor-
porations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. 
BUS. L. REV. 85, 102–03 (2012) (arguing that the benefit corporation will be an unlikely choice for 
large corporations because all of the shareholders would have to choose to adopt a singular corporate 
mission, aside from the production of profit). 
 29 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 (“The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain [shareholder profit], and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction 
of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other 
purposes.”) (alteration in original). 
 30 See Page & Katz, supra note 28, at 230 (discussing the events leading up to and during Unile-
ver’s acquisition of Ben & Jerry’s); April Dembosky, Protecting Companies That Mix Profitability, 
Values, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 9, 2010, 12:00 AM), www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=124468487 [https://perma.cc/SZ3Z-YDLQ] (stating that the sale of Ben & Jerry’s “helped set 
the stage for today’s young, idealistic companies”). 
 31 See, e.g., Page & Katz, supra note 28, at 229 (noting that Ben Cohen, one of the founders of 
Ben & Jerry’s, is quoted as saying that the board did not want to sell). The assertion that corporate law 
would require a sale of a company to the highest bidder in order to avoid a shareholder derivative suit is 
true only in very limited circumstances. See J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Prof-
it: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability 
Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 34 (2011) (noting that courts will decline to challenge the majori-
ty of directors’ decisions); Page & Katz, supra note 28, at 232 (same). Absent evidence of some corpo-
rate perversion, courts will defer to the business judgment of corporate directors and will not disturb a 
business decision unless there is no rational basis upon which it could have been made. See Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (enumerating the business judgment rule, which is the “pre-
sumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, 
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Proponents of the benefit corporation sought to quell the fears of social entre-
preneurs by disrupting the traditional for-profit, non-profit binary and using 
for-profit entities as tools for betterment of the public good.32 
In addition to a socially conscious sentiment from entrepreneurs, the devel-
opment of the benefit corporation may also be the result of an increase in social-
ly conscious consumers and investors.33 A 2015 study found that 66% of con-
sumers surveyed were willing to pay more for products and services purchased 
from companies committed to positive social and environmental impact, up from 
                                                                                                                           
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company”); 
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (holding that whether “the decision of 
the directors was a correct one” would be “beyond [the court’s] jurisdiction and ability”) (alteration in 
original). But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986) (finding that when it becomes apparent that the sale of a corporation is inevitable, the “direc-
tors’ role change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the 
best price for the stockholders”) (alteration in original). After the sale of Ben & Jerry’s to Unilever, the 
conglomerate agreed to continue Ben & Jerry’s commitment to social causes by donating 7.5% of Ben & 
Jerry’s profits to a charitable foundation and agreed not to cut jobs or alter the production process. Con-
stance L. Hays, Ben & Jerry’s to Unilever, with Attitude, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2000), http://
www.nytimes.com/2000/04/13/business/ben-jerry-s-to-unilever-with-attitude.html?%20src=pm 
[https://perma.cc/B27J-5A22]. Unlike Ben & Jerry’s, however, “other mission-driven companies may 
not have the same bargaining power to protect their own businesses.” See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, 
at 836 (arguing that benefit corporations’ missions may be destroyed or discouraged after acquisitions 
by large corporations); see also Thomas Lee, Plum Organics’ Quest to Do Good Poses Legal Risk to 
Campbell Soup, SFGATE (Nov. 10, 2014, 11:56 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/green/article/Plum-
Organics-quest-to-do-good-poses-legal-5882197.php [https://perma.cc/5ULT-7E46] (discussing Plum 
Organics’ decision to reincorporate as a public benefit corporation after it was acquired by Campbell 
Soup Co. and Campbell’s approval of the decision). 
 32 See Khatib, supra note 9, at 151 (arguing that the benefit corporation was created “to quell the 
fears of entrepreneurs pursuing social and environmental objectives and profit”); Munch, supra note 
5, at 170 (describing the emergence of a new type of entrepreneur that wants to produce positive so-
cial impact in addition to profit); Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1361 (2011) (noting that “proponents of 
social enterprise seek to promote and facilitate social enterprise formation through business organiza-
tions law”); Reiser, supra note 10, at 683–84 (describing entrepreneurs’ “desire to blend their profit-
making and social missions in a single entity”). 
 33 See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 819–21 (describing the increasing consumer demand for 
socially responsible companies and the products they produce and sell); Thomas J. White III, Benefit 
Corporations: Increased Oversight Through Creation of the Benefit Corporation Commission, 41 J. 
LEGIS. 329, 329–30 (2015) (noting that consumers have become more interested in production pro-
cesses rather than the products itself, corporations have “adjusted in an effort to match the increased 
demand in social responsibility,” and venture capitalist investors have started to take an interest in 
these companies). This is not entirely a new phenomenon. See LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, BUYING 
POWER: A HISTORY OF CONSUMER ACTIVISM IN AMERICA 1 (2009) (noting that throughout Ameri-
can history, consumers “have engaged in an almost continuous series of boycotts, demands for leisure 
and recreation, campaigns for access to the benefits of consumer society, and efforts to promote safe 
and ethical consumption”). Consumer activism waned but then regained popularity in the latter part of 
the 1980s and 1990s, continuing into today. Id. at 305. In particular, the “tendency toward political 
consumerism has accelerated” post-9/11. Id. 
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55% in 2014 and 50% in 2013.34 The rise in socially conscious consumers has 
also led to significant investment in socially conscious businesses.35 A 2010 re-
port from J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. concluded that an increasing number of in-
vestors have discarded the choice between investing for profit and donating to 
charity.36 In 2008, the Silicon Valley venture capital firm, Kleiner Perkins Cau-
field & Byers, announced that it was launching a “Green Growth Fund,” focus-
ing on investments in companies pursuing “green” ventures.37 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Green Generation: Millennials Say Sustainability Is a Shopping Priority, NIELSON (Nov. 11, 
2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/green-generation-millennials-say-sustain
ability-is-a-shopping-priority.html [https://perma.cc/SDG9-TE98] [hereinafter NIELSON]. Nielson’s Sen-
ior Vice President of Public Development & Sustainability stated: “Brands that establish a reputation for 
environmental stewardship among today’s youngest consumers have an opportunity to not only grow 
market share but build loyalty among the power-spending Millennials of tomorrow, too.” Id. In addition, 
an increasingly negative public perception of large corporations may have contributed to the rise of the 
benefit corporation. See Callison, supra note 28, at 89–91 (describing the social enterprise movement’s 
push for new legislation); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 5, at 3–4 (discussing the rise of 
“social enterprise” in the aftermath of a multitude of corporate scandals); Susan Holberg & Mark 
Schmitt, The Overpaid CEO, DEMOCRACY J. (2014), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/34/the-
overpaid-ceo/2/?nomobile=1 [https://perma.cc/6QN8-QFWE] (discussing the controversy surrounding 
executive compensation and citing the benefit corporation form as recognizing that there are corporate 
stakeholders beyond shareholders). During the past few decades, accounts of corporations that caused 
economic, social, and environmental destruction in pursuit of profit have been plastered on the front 
pages of newspapers around the world. See Janine S. Hiller, The Benefit Corporation and Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 287, 287 (2013) (“In the wake of the most recent financial 
crisis, corporations have been criticized as being self-interested and unmindful of their relationship to 
society.”); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 5, at 3–4 (discussing recent corporate scan-
dals). 
 35 See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 819–21 (describing the socially conscious consumer 
trend); Nass, supra note 11, at 876–77 (describing the rise in socially conscious consumers and inves-
tors); William H. Clark, Jr. et al., The Need and Rationale for the Benefit Corporation: Why It Is the 
Legal Form That Best Addresses the Needs of Social Entrepreneurs, Investors, and Ultimately, the 
Public, BENEFIT CORP. 2, http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/benefit-corporation-white-paper 
[https://perma.cc/K9BC-ENRW] (same); cf. Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The 
Convenient Truth of How the Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in So-
cial Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 624 (2007) (noting that the social entrepreneurship 
movement “is gaining respect among the younger generation of tomorrow’s tech and business leaders 
as well as with long existing, publicly-held corporations”). 
 36 J.P. MORGAN GLOBAL RESEARCH, supra note 25, at 5; see Tom Zeller, Jr., Can Business Do 
the Job All by Itself?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/business/
energy-environment/29green.html [https://perma.cc/K8H4-KTZK] (noting that investors are increas-
ingly recognizing that “doing good . . . also enhance[s] shareholder value”) (alteration in original). 
Starting in 2011, Forbes began publishing the “Impact 30,” an annual list of prominent global social-
ly-conscious entrepreneurs. See Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate 
Law: A Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the 
Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 644 (2013) (describing the Impact 30); Im-
pact 30, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/impact-30/list.html [https://perma.cc/Q8BP-T2HR]. 
 37 See Rebecca Buckman, Kleiner Fund Will Target ‘Green’ Ventures, WALL STREET J. (May 1, 
2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120961269993458707 [https://perma.cc/XE2Y-
X7HD] (describing the “Green Growth Fund”); Martin LeMonica, Kleiner Perkins Launces $500 
Million Green Growth Fund, CNET (May 1, 2008, 8:01 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/kleiner-
perkins-launches-500-million-green-growth-fund/ [https://perma.cc/6UXD-FYX3] (same). For further 
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The growth in consumers’ commitment to buying ethically and environ-
mentally sourced goods has also led to the creation of B Lab, a private certifi-
cation organization, which verifies socially and environmentally conscious 
businesses.38 Jay Coen Gilbert, the co-founder of B Lab, has advocated for a 
“triple bottom-line approach” to corporate management: “profit, people and 
planet,” which encourages corporate directors to weigh human and environ-
mental costs together with profit building in their decision making.39 B Lab 
certification is a heuristic for consumers, but it is also a key marketing tool for 
merchants targeting socially conscious consumers and investors.40 
                                                                                                                           
illustration, the private equity firm, Bain Capital, introduced a social impact investment platform, which 
“focus[es] on ‘double bottom line’ investments” that seek return on investment in addition to enhancing 
downtrodden communities and “improving quality of life.” Former Massachusetts Governor Deval L. 
Patrick Joins Bain Capital to Launch New Business Focused on Investments with Significant Social 
Impact, BAIN CAPITAL (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.baincapital.com/news/former-massachusetts-
governor-deval-l-patrick-joins-bain-capital-launch-new-business-focused [https://perma.cc/M2HS-
QVY7] (alteration in original). In the past, Bain Capital has been targeted for being motivated only by 
profit, lacking regard for the human consequences of its corporate takeovers. Sabrina Siddiqui, Mitt 
Romney, Bain Capital Targeted Over GST Steel Plant Closure in New Priorities USA Action Ad, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2012, 6:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/07/mitt-
romney-bain-capital-gst-steel-plant-closure_n_1749296.html [https://perma.cc/QP7N-6GYF]. 
 38 About B Lab, B CORP., https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-b-lab [https://
perma.cc/7U8G-2QPW]; see 2014 Annual Report, B CORP., https://www.bcorporation.net/news-
media/annual-report-2014 [https://perma.cc/8JJ9-H22A] [hereinafter 2014 Annual Report] (noting the 
rise in companies seeking certification). According to B Lab’s 2014 Annual Report, the organization has 
certified over 1000 businesses. 2014 Annual Report, supra. B Lab has also been active in lobbying for 
the passage of benefit corporation legislation. See Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 5, 
at 249 n.4, 346 (discussing the role of the B Lab organization). The organization even assisted in 
drafting the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (“Model Legislation”), which has been the blue-
print for the majority of states’ benefit corporation statutes. Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporations 
and Strategic Action Fields or (The Existential Failing of Delaware), 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 282 
(2016). The certified “B Corp” concept is easily confused with benefit corporations themselves, but B 
Corps are not necessarily incorporated under a state’s benefit corporation statute. See Mark J. Loewen-
stein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1038 n.20 
(2013) (explaining that certified B Corps do not necessarily need to be incorporated as benefit corpo-
rations). Under B Lab’s rules, however, if a certified B Corp is incorporated in states with a benefit cor-
poration statute, the business must reincorporate as a benefit corporation within four years of receiving B 
Corp certification. Corporation Legal Roadmap, B CORP., https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/legal-roadmap/corporation-legal-roadmap [https://perma.cc/9HV4-
795E]. The certification is similar to the LEED certification for buildings or the Fair Trade certification 
for food products. B-Lab, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/us/patagonia.go?assetid=68413 
[https://perma.cc/9NDW-RYCZ] (discussing the B Lab certification). A similar organization, Social 
Enterprise UK, exists in the United Kingdom. FAQs, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE UK, http://www.social
enterprise.org.uk/about/about-social-enterprise/FAQs [https://perma.cc/8SFX-VJB7]. 
 39 Josh Patrick, Assessing the Benefits of Becoming a Benefit Corporation, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 
2013, 1:00 PM), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/assessing-the-benefits-of-a-benefit-
corporation [https://perma.cc/5U24-9EEC]. Prior to co-founding B Lab, Jay Coen Gilbert co-founded 
the basketball shoe and apparel company AND 1. Jay Coen Gilbert, B CORP., https://www.
bcorporation.net/jay-coen-gilbert-0 [https://perma.cc/X8AP-W42K]. 
 40 See Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1013 (noting that B Lab certification can increase a compa-
ny’s marketability and aid in attracting investment); NIELSON, supra note 34 (finding that many con-
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B. Fake It ’til You Make It: “Greenwashing” and Benefit Corporations 
For-profit corporations often exploit what has been coined the “sheep’s 
clothing principle.”41 This is the idea that a benevolent charitable act by a cor-
poration is likely to also be a carefully designed advertising scheme.42 A prob-
lem arises in the benefit corporation context when companies reap the brand-
ing and goodwill benefits of the benefit corporation classification while only 
pretending to pursue and create public benefits.43 The drafters of the Model 
                                                                                                                           
sumers are willing to pay more for goods purchased from socially conscious businesses). A few nota-
ble B Corps include Patagonia, Warby Parker, Ben & Jerry’s (a subsidiary of Unilever PLC), Plum Or-
ganics (a subsidiary of Campbell Soup Co.), The Honest Company, Method Products, Etsy, and Kick-
starter. See Ben & Jerry’s, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/community/ben-and-jerrys [https://
perma.cc/4LHW-BAPB]; Kickstarter PBC, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/community/
kickstarter-pbc [https://perma.cc/XG9G-HYQ4]; Method Products, PBC, B CORP., https://www.
bcorporation.net/community/method-products-pbc [https://perma.cc/XGA8-TVRK]; Patagonia, Inc., 
B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/community/patagonia-inc [https://perma.cc/9EP9-6JM5]; Plum 
Organics, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/community/plum-organics [https://perma.cc/MSY2-
N35R]; The Honest Company, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/community/the-honest-company 
[https://perma.cc/4PQJ-XALB]; Warby Parker, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/community/
warby-parker [https://perma.cc/874X-P7B8]. 
 41 Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 14; cf. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the Charitable 
Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 1351 (2015) (discussing the “benefits (some tangible and some 
intangible)” that charitable givers receive in return for giving). 
 42 Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 14. Examples of this could include Johnson & Johnson’s Safe Kids 
Worldwide, Avon’s Breast Cancer Crusade, and the many philanthropic arms of major corporations, 
such as the Ronald McDonald House Charities and the Coca-Cola Foundation. See About Us, 
RONALD MCDONALD HOUSE CHARITIES, http://www.rmhc.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/KQA6-
J2TK]; Breast Cancer Crusade, AVON FOUND. FOR WOMEN, http://www.avonfoundation.org/causes/
breast-cancer-crusade/ [https://perma.cc/QY4N-V2T7]; Johnson & Johnson, SAFE KIDS WORLDWIDE, 
http://www.safekids.org/johnson-johnson [https://perma.cc/WW3M-YVCH]; The Coca-Cola Founda-
tion, COCA-COLA CO., http://www.coca-colacompany.com/our-company/the-coca-cola-foundation/ 
[https://perma.cc/ET2H-WGGA]. 
 43 See Alex Barinka & Jesse Drucker, Etsy Taps Secret Irish Tax Haven and Brags About Trans-
parency at Home, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-08-14/etsy-taps-secret-irish-tax-haven-and-touts-transparency-at-home [https://perma.
cc/F3FT-WNU9] (reporting on the secretive Irish tax haven that Etsy, Inc., a certified B Corp, recent-
ly implemented despite “promis[ing] to be a beacon for transparency as a public company”); see also 
Steven Davidoff Solomon, Idealism That May Leave Shareholders Wishing for Pragmatism, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/business/dealbook/laureate-education-
for-profit-school-public-benefit.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/5JTR-BBHW] (arguing that benefit cor-
porations’ “eye-grabbing do-gooding may mask deep, complicated issues”); Hannah Clark Steiman, A 
New Kind of Company: A “B” Corporation, INC. MAG. (July 1, 2007), http://www.inc.com/magazine/
20070701/priority-a-new-kind-of-company.html [https://perma.cc/E9BB-ZNH8] (arguing that social 
purpose “[c]ertification, however, can be somewhat suspect; some organic farmers, for example, have 
said the organic certification system has actually weakened their movement by enabling the creation 
of organic factory farms”). Interestingly, Massachusetts forbids a company from advertising its benefit 
corporation status unless the company is in full compliance with the state’s benefit corporation statute. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 7; cf. Munch, supra note 5, at 190 (arguing that the “benefit corpora-
tion form may have limited effectiveness if it is does not include broader legal enforcement mecha-
nisms”). 
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Benefit Corporation Legislation (“Model Legislation”) anticipated this phe-
nomenon and termed it “greenwashing.”44 
Benefit corporations are in a unique position to capitalize on the socially 
conscious consumer trend by attracting patrons willing to pay a premium for 
ethically-sourced and -produced goods.45 For example, in 2012, Patagonia, the 
outdoor clothing company and California benefit corporation, recorded over 
$500 million in sales and opened fourteen new stores while the company ran a 
nine-month “buy less” advertising campaign.46 Ironically, that campaign en-
couraged customers to buy used products or hold onto their current products 
for a longer period of time.47 Companies can use the socially responsible con-
                                                                                                                           
 44 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 cmt. The term “greenwashing,” as used by the 
drafters of the Model Legislation, is taken from the environmental context and then applied more gener-
ally to the infinite number of public benefits that could be a benefit corporation’s purpose to create. See 
id.; Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility 
Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 846 (2008); Greenwashing, GREENPEACE, http://www.
stopgreenwash.org [https://perma.cc/ER6J-ZS3T] (defining “greenwash” as “the act of misleading 
consumers regarding the environmental practices of a company or the environmental benefits of a 
product or service”); Greenwashing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/greenwashing [https://perma.cc/3N25-XYYP] (defining “greenwashing” as “expressions of 
environmentalist concerns especially as a cover for products, policies, or activities”); cf. Alicia E. 
Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to 
New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 258 (2012) (discussing 
“mission-drift,” a concept similar to “greenwashing,” which occurs when a benefit corporation “pri-
oritiz[es] shareholder gain at the expense of the social or environmental mission of the firm”) (altera-
tion in original). Some argue that inclusion of a third-party standard setter negates the possibility of 
the creation of nominal benefit corporations designed to “cash in on the cachet of being perceived as 
‘green’” when the corporations are not actually creating any public benefits. Benefit Corporation 
White Paper, supra note 9, at 1104. 
 45 See NIELSEN, supra note 34 (noting that consumers are willing to pay more for “green” prod-
ucts); see also Benefits of Becoming a Sustainable Business, ECO-FFICIENCY, http://www.eco-
officiency.com/benefits_becoming_sustainable_business.html [https://perma.cc/UV4L-T9G5] (noting 
that becoming a benefit corporation can lead to “enhanced brand and increase[d] competitive ad-
vantage”) (alteration in original); Mehdi Miremadi et al., How Much Will Consumers Pay to Go 
Green?, MCKINSEY & CO. (Oct. 2012), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability-
and-resource-productivity/our-insights/how-much-will-consumers-pay-to-go-green [https://perma.cc/
6Y6X-HJMA] (describing a survey which found that 70% of respondents in Europe and the United 
States were willing to pay 5% more for “green” products). 
 46 Kyle Stock, Patagonia’s ‘Buy Less’ Plea Spurs More Buying, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-08-28/patagonias-buy-less-plea-spurs-more-buying 
[https://perma.cc/Q8AG-QKRX]. 
 47 Id. Patagonia is perhaps the quintessential benefit corporation; since 1985, well before the 
advent of the benefit corporation form, the outdoor clothing company pledged 1% of sales to causes 
that preserve and protect the environment. 1% for the Planet, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.
com/us/patagonia.go?assetid=81218 [https://perma.cc/9GG6-NCST]. The company also provides 
health care and flexible working schedules even to part-time workers, mandates a code of conduct for 
materials suppliers, and uses environmentally friendly materials. Murray, supra note 27, at 487–88. 
As a mass-market company, Patagonia has, at times, struggled to maintain its socially conscious brand 
due to its relationships with materials suppliers. See Erica E. Phillips, Patagonia’s Balancing Act: 
Chasing Mass-Market Appeal While Doing No Harm, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 17, 2016, 5:30 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/patagonias-balancing-act-chasing-mass-market-appeal-while-doing-no-
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sumer movement to “distinguish their goods in the market” by offering 
“green” variations of already-established products.48 
Sometimes, however, corporate humanitarian rhetoric is simply “window 
dressing,” designed to lure consumers into thinking a company supports social 
or environmental causes when it actually does not.49 For example, during the 
past decade, the oil and gas conglomerate British Petroleum (“BP”), which is 
not a benefit corporation, made a calculated series of branding moves designed 
to convey an environmentally conscious image.50 BP advertised that it was 
making operations more efficient, reducing carbon emissions, and investing in 
renewable energy sources.51 In a now infamous turn of events, however, in 
April 2010, BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded and sank, hemor-
rhaging oil into the Gulf of Mexico.52 The catastrophic environmental damage 
caused by the explosion has been blamed, at least partly, on the fact that the 
company ignored warning signs that the rig was in danger of failure in order to 
reduce costs.53 
                                                                                                                           
harm-1471426200 [https://perma.cc/QB2R-QAAJ] (describing steps the company has taken to main-
tain control over its supply chain in order to avoid contracting with producers that do not hold them-
selves to Patagonia’s ethical standards). 
 48 See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1431, 1453 (2006) (discussing how companies can differentiate their products to attract 
socially conscious consumers); see also Frequently Asked Questions, HONEST CO., https://www.
honest.com/faq [https://perma.cc/UMG3-YEE7] (discussing how The Honest Company, a certified B 
Corp, creates and sells household products without harmful chemicals). 
 49 Kerr, supra note 44, at 855 (quoting Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate 
Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
836, 838 (2007)) (noting that some companies “introduce [corporate social responsibility] practices at 
a superficial level for window dressing purposes”) (alteration in original); Khatib, supra note 9, at 
181–82 (arguing that “there exists enormous potential for [benefit corporation] statutes to lead to 
legalized greenwashing”) (alteration in original). A 2007 study found that of one thousand “green” 
products reviewed, all but one engaged in some sort of “greenwashing” advertising scheme. TERRA-
CHOICE ENVTL. MKTG. INC., THE SIX SINS OF GREENWASHING: A STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
CLAIMS IN NORTH AMERICAN CONSUMER MARKETS 1 (2007), http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/
findings/greenwashing-report-2007 [https://perma.cc/R66X-7TQ8]. 
 50 See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 1002–03 (2011) (de-
scribing the various steps BP took to improve its environmental image). BP also ran a series of adver-
tisements aimed at educating individual consumers about their personal environmental impact. Id. at 
1002. 
 51 Id. at 1002–03. 
 52 Id. at 988. 
 53 See STOUT, supra note 27, at 1–2 (describing the BP oil spill and noting that the disaster could 
be linked to decisions to ignore safety warnings in order to save money); Experts: BP Ignored Warn-
ing Signs on Doomed Well, FOX NEWS (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/11/17/
experts-bp-ignored-warning-signs-doomed-1127061394.html [https://perma.cc/XY5N-655M] (dis-
cussing the finding that BP ignored warning signs of the rig’s instability). Coca-Cola recently faced 
criticism in Denmark after its “PlantBottle,” marketed as an environmentally friendly alternative to 
traditional plastic bottles, was found to contain only 15% plant-based materials. See Christopher Zara, 
Coca-Cola Company (KO) Busted for ‘Greenwashing’: PlantBottle Marketing Exaggerated Environ-
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II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND DIRECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN BENEFIT 
CORPORATIONS, TRADITIONAL CORPORATIONS, AND  
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
Despite the prerogative to pursue humanitarian objectives, benefit corpora-
tions are nonetheless a form of traditional corporations, and as such, directors of 
both types of corporations are subject to the same common law fiduciary obliga-
tions.54 Benefit corporation legislation as a whole, however, purports to include 
additional reporting requirements and accountability mechanisms not found in 
the traditional corporate form.55 Section A of this Part outlines basic concepts in 
corporate law, and discusses the benefit corporation within this broader frame-
work.56 Section B then describes benefit corporation directors’ duties and ac-
countability procedures.57 Section C explores the statutory and common law 
power of state attorneys general to oversee nonprofit organizations.58 
A. Corporate Law Primer and an Overview of the Typical Benefit 
Corporation Characteristics 
The items that must appear in a company’s certificate of incorporation are 
more simplistic than required by earlier law, and today, certificates of incorpo-
                                                                                                                           
mental Benefits, Says Consumer Report, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013, 3:18 PM), http://www.
ibtimes.com/coca-cola-company-ko-busted-greenwashing-plantbottle-marketing-exaggerated-
environmental-benefits [https://perma.cc/Y3VD-T9SS]. For further illustration, in 2016, two lab tests 
commissioned by the Wall Street Journal found that detergent products produced by The Honest 
Company, a certified B Corp founded by actress Jessica Alba, contained a harmful chemical, which 
the company claims it does not use. Serena Ng, Laundry Detergent from Jessica Alba’s Honest Co. 
Contains Ingredient It Pledged to Avoid, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 10, 2016, 7:08 PM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/laundry-detergent-from-jessica-albas-honest-co-contains-ingredient-it-pledged-to-
avoid-1457647350 [https://perma.cc/CW4M-VPXX]. 
 54 See MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS 
128 (2011) (noting that the basic fiduciary duties, split between ownership and management, and tax 
status in the benefit corporation form are generally the same as in traditional corporations); Robert A. 
Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 86 (2010) (comparing social 
enterprise business forms to the traditional business form). Although there are other corporate forms 
that pursue humanitarian goals in addition to profit, such as the Low-Profit Limited Liability Compa-
ny (“L3C”), the benefit corporation is the quintessential business form designed to balance these two 
goals. See Esposito, supra note 36, at 649, 681–94 (discussing the L3C, Flexible Purpose Corporation, 
Social Purpose Corporation, and benefit corporation forms and arguing that the benefit corporation is 
the most effective vehicle for “achieving the blended value goals of the social enterprise movement”). 
The L3C form is a hybrid business organization “that attempts to blend program related investments, 
with some small degree of income production for private foundations.” Ann E. Conaway, The Global 
Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 772, 802 (2012) (internal quotations omitted). 
 55 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 237–40 (noting the additional requirements included in benefit 
corporation legislation). 
 56 See infra notes 59–70 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 71–97 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 98–128 and accompanying text. 
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ration must only state that a corporation exists to “conduct or promote any law-
ful business or purposes.”59 Benefit corporation legislation diverges from this 
generalist approach by requiring that such corporations must, to use the Model 
Legislation as an example, “have a purpose of creating a general public bene-
fit,” in addition to the “any lawful business or purposes” language.60 Further-
more, benefit corporation legislation provides that a company’s certificate of 
incorporation may identify the creation of one or more “specific public bene-
fits.”61 Benefit corporations, like traditional corporations, however, operate for 
profit and do not receive any of the unique tax benefits available to non-profit 
organizations.62 
A corporation’s board of directors is responsible for managing the busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation.63 In general, shareholders, not directors, 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101(b), 102(a)(3) (2016); ERNEST L. FOLK, III, THE DELAWARE 
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §102.01 cmt. (6th ed. 2015); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as 
Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 100 (2015); see also Matter of Appraisal of 
Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 976 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the fact that un-
like the corporation law of the nineteenth century, modern corporate law “is largely enabling in char-
acter”). 
 60 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 201(a)–(b) (BENEFIT CORP. 2014) http://benefitcorp.net/
sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5XZ-WVXH]. 
(defining a general public benefit as something having “[a] material positive impact on society and the 
environment”). 
 61 Id. § 201(b). Per the Model Legislation, examples of “specific public benefits” include: (1) 
providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial products or services; 
(2) promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in the 
normal course of business; (3) protecting or restoring the environment; (4) improving human health; 
(5) promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge; (6) increasing the flow of capital to 
entities with a purpose to benefit society or the environment; and (7) conferring any other particular 
benefit on society or the environment. Id. § 102 cmt. 
 62 See LANE, supra note 54, at 128 (noting that benefit corporations are taxed in the same manner 
as any other for-profit corporation); Benefit Corp FAQ’s, supra note 15 (same). 
 63 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized 
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Since a director is vested with the responsibility for the management of 
the affairs of the corporation, he must execute that duty with the recognition that he acts on behalf of 
others.”). Delaware’s corporate law is generally considered the most refined, and the state is home to the 
majority of the country’s public corporations, which are thus governed by Delaware law. See Steven C. 
Caywood, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable Solution 
in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 111, 136 n.26 (2010) (noting 
that Delaware is home to the majority of the country’s corporations); Harwell Wells, The Rise of the 
Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 269 (2008) (not-
ing that Delaware is the “most important site” for the development of U.S. corporate law); About 
Agency, DEL. DEP’T STATE, DIV. CORPS., http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/MV4M-YNY6] (“More than 50% of all publicly-traded companies in the United 
States including 64% of the Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as their legal home.”). Indeed, most 
states rely on Delaware law as an example when interpreting or drafting their own corporate law. Clark 
& Babson, supra note 1, at 831. 
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own the majority share of a corporation’s stock.64 But in large, particularly 
public corporations, shareholders lack any real control over operations and 
business decision making, and as such, place their trust in the directors.65 Thus, 
as a fundamental principle, corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to the 
shareholders, breaches of which are righted through shareholder derivative 
lawsuits.66 Perhaps most importantly, however, directors of benefit corpora-
tions and directors of traditional corporations do not owe a fiduciary duty to 
any constituency other than the shareholders.67 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Eric M. Fogel et al., Public Company Shareholders Acting as Owners: Three Reforms—
Introducing the “Oversight Shareholder,” 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517, 518 (2004) (arguing that share-
holders of large public corporations do not exercise control and instead, simply sell their shares when 
problems arise); Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 
1251–52 (2010) (discussing the difference between “ownership” and “control” of corporations). 
 65 Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 206 n.34 (Del. 2008) (citing R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE 
A. FINKELSTEIN, 1 THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.16, 
at 4–113 (3d ed. 2008)); Fogel et al., supra note 64, at 518 (arguing that “an imbalance exists between 
management flexibility and investor/owner oversight”). 
 66 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (providing the derivative suit mechanism); LANE, supra note 
54, at 120 (describing the corporate fiduciary duties of loyalty and care); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. 
McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1771 
(2007) (discussing corporate fiduciary duties); Marcia M. McMurray, An Historical Perspective on 
the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 606 
(1987). In simplest terms, the duty of loyalty mandates that the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders take precedence over any interest of the directors that is not shared collectively by the 
shareholders. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750–52 (Del. Ch. 2005), 
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). The duty of care, on the other hand, generally does not encompass the 
substance of a board decision but the method by which the board reached its decision. Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Due care in the decision-making context is process due care only.”). In 
order to comply with the duty of care, in general, directors must properly inform themselves of all mate-
rial information prior to rendering a decision. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. The duty of care, has, 
however, been rendered all-but obsolete by section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware corporate law. See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2016) (stating that a provision included in a certificate of incorporation 
can eliminate personal monetary liability for a director, but not for breaches of the duty of loyalty). 
 67 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) (denying standing to intended beneficiaries); McMurray, 
supra note 66, at 606 (discussing the fiduciary duties directors owe to shareholders). Compare Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (suggesting that when deciding whether 
to accept a tender offer, a board of directors may consider “the impact on constituencies other than 
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)”) 
(internal quotations omitted), with Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 182 (Del. 1986) (finding that when the sale of a corporation is inevitable, the directors’ only 
prerogative is to sell at the highest price for the benefit of the shareholders). Following the merger 
craze of the 1980s, many states implemented “constituency statutes,” which grant a board of directors 
the authority to consider the best interests of other “corporate constituencies when running a sales 
process or deciding whether to accept a takeover offer.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Direc-
tors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 238 (2014). But these statutes have little 
weight because they simply allow directors to consider non-financial stakeholders and do not require 
directors to do so. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(a)(1) (2014) (providing that a board of directors “may, 
in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider . . . [t]he effects of any action upon any or 
all groups affected by such action, including . . . communities in which offices or other establishments 
of the corporation are located”); see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituen-
cy Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 987 (1992) (noting that constituency statutes are “permissive” and 
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Each state’s benefit corporation is slightly different, but the typical char-
acteristics are: (1) that the corporation pledge to create a general public benefit, 
(2) that the directors consider the interests of non-financial stakeholders in ad-
dition to the interests of shareholders, and (3) a requirement to report on the 
corporation’s total social and environmental performance using a third-party 
standard.68 With the exception of these three general duties, however, directors 
of benefit corporations and directors of traditional corporations are governed 
by the same principles of corporate law.69 Despite the duty to consider the im-
pact of a benefit corporation’s activities on constituencies other than share-
holders, benefit corporation legislation denies those constituencies standing to 
enforce this requirement.70 
                                                                                                                           
do not require directors to consider non-financial stakeholder’s interests). Notably, however, Dela-
ware, long the bastion of corporate law, chose not to enact a constituency statute. See Khatib, supra 
note 9, at 169 (noting that Delaware did not enact a constituency statute). 
 68 See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION §§ 201(a), 301(a), 401(a)(2); Clark & Babson, supra 
note 1, at 838–39 (listing these three general characteristics). 
 69 See LANE, supra note 54, at 127–29 (comparing the basics of the benefit corporation form to its 
traditional corporation counterpart); Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporations: Do the Benefits Exceed 
the Costs?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 2, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/11/02/
benefit-corporations-do-the-benefits-exceed-the-costs/ [https://perma.cc/G6VS-T332] (explaining that 
the requirement that directors “must,” as opposed to “may,” pursue social purposes beyond profit is 
the key difference between benefit corporations and traditional corporate forms); Mark A. Underberg, 
Benefit Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. BLOG (May 13, 2012), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/05/
13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corporations-a-harmful-dichotomy [https://perma.cc/59VE-86FU] 
(arguing that the benefit corporation “legal regime no more guarantees that those companies will make 
‘socially responsible’ decisions than existing law prevents directors from doing so”); see also Rae 
André, Assessing the Accountability of the Benefit Corporation: Will This New Gray Sector Organiza-
tion Enhance Corporate Social Responsibility?, 110 J. BUS. ETHICS 133, 138 (2012) (arguing that a 
traditional corporation’s only “mission” is to make money, whereas a benefit corporation can have 
“many missions”). 
 70 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) (denying standing to intended beneficiaries); 15 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 3321(d) (2014) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(c) (2016) (same); MODEL 
BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION. § 305(a) (same). In contrast, unless authorized in their founding docu-
ments, nonprofit organizations do not have a derivative suit option, and as such, state attorneys general 
supervise these organizations on behalf of the public. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW 
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 363 (rev. 2d & 3d ed. Supp. 2015) (noting that state attorneys general 
have enforcement power over charitable trusts); Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and 
Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 938–39 (2004) (noting that all state 
attorneys general have common law enforcement power over charities and some states provide a statu-
tory grant of authority to attorneys general); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and 
Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 
14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 408–12 (2012) (discussing the role of state attorneys general’s oversight of 
charities in various states and the limited availability of derivative actions in the nonprofit context); 
Reiser, supra note 15, at 241 (noting that “[s]tate attorneys general safeguard assets devoted to charity 
within their states”). 
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B. Fiduciary Duties of Directors and Internal Control in the  
Benefit Corporation Form 
Benefit corporations, like traditional corporations, are for the most part, 
monitored by shareholders.71 The very nature of the benefit corporation, how-
ever, extends the scope of the business judgment rule; directors of a benefit 
corporation could defend a decision that eschews short-term profit not only on 
the grounds that the decision would eventually lead to long-term profits, but 
also that the decision furthers the creation of the corporation’s public benefit.72 
Ostensibly, shareholders are left with a theory of waste as their only remaining 
argument.73 The doctrine of waste sets an extremely “low bar for defendants to 
justify their decisions”—even lower than that set by the business judgment 
rule.74 Absent a clear breach of the duty of loyalty (or the duty of care in lim-
ited circumstances), shareholders of benefit corporations have a miniscule like-
lihood of success in a derivative suit that challenges a business decision.75 
Benefit corporation legislation does, however, impose an important addi-
tional fiduciary obligation: directors must consider the effects of their decision 
making on constituencies other than shareholders.76 A decision purportedly 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 240 (arguing that in the context of benefit corporation legislation, 
“reliance on self-policing or investor-only accountability is suboptimal”); Nass, supra note 11, at 886 
(noting that accountability mechanisms in benefit corporation legislation are only available to inves-
tors and company-insiders). 
 72 See Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Bene-
fit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 38 (2014). A company’s directors could, for 
example, defend the use of expensive but environmentally friendly containers by arguing that in so 
doing, they are garnering “customer good-will which could boost their sales.” Id. 
 73 Cf. id. (noting that under the business judgment rule, “[d]efendants are protected from claims 
that a decision was a bad deal for the corporation as long as they could rationally believe that it was a 
good deal,” which is similar to the waste doctrine). To succeed on a theory of corporate waste, a plain-
tiff must show that there was “an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately 
small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.” Brehm, 
746 A.2d at 263. In 1969, in Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, the Delaware Chancery Court 
held that a charitable gift within tax deduction limits was reasonable, did not constitute waste, and was 
not made in violation of any fiduciary duties. 257 A.2d 398, 399 (Del. Ch. 1969). The court noted that 
it was “obvious” that a “relatively small loss of immediate income” was outweighed by the long-term 
benefit conferred on the corporation by giving the gift. Id. at 405. 
 74 Henderson, 257 A.2d at 405. 
 75 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (holding that under the business judg-
ment rule, “[a]bsent an abuse of discretion, [the board’s] judgment will be respected”) (alteration in 
original). 
 76 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 365(a) (requiring directors to balance the interests of shareholders, 
the interests of parties “materially affected by the corporation’s activities,” and creation of the corpora-
tion’s public benefit); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(1) (requiring benefit corporation 
directors to consider the effect of their decision making on constituencies other than shareholders). 
Although requiring a balancing of interests, benefit corporation legislation does not mandate that 
directors prioritize interests. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/4.01(a)(3) (2014) (stating that benefit 
corporation directors are not required to give priority of any group over another, unless the corpora-
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with this mandate in mind, however, would be nearly impossible for a court to 
critique and reverse.77 In order to challenge a breach of this provision by de-
rivative suit, in some states, shareholders must individually or collectively 
own, the lesser of two percent of the company’s outstanding shares or $2 mil-
lion in market value of the corporation’s shares traded on a national securities 
exchange.78 In contrast, in order to file a derivative suit alleging a fiduciary 
duty violation not related to this provision, corporate law generally requires 
only that a plaintiff own at least one share of the corporation at the time of the 
transaction at issue.79 As the current Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme 
Court wrote, “[W]hen corporate fiduciaries [are] allowed to consider all inter-
ests without legally binding constraints, they [are] freed of accountability to 
any.”80 
Aside from traditional derivative suits, benefit corporation legislation at-
tempts to provide other accountability mechanisms.81 Perhaps most closely 
related to a derivative suit, the legislation provides for initiation of a “benefit 
enforcement proceeding” to compel the directors to follow-through on their 
public benefit commitment(s).82 Here too, intended beneficiaries lack standing, 
and only shareholders, directors, or investors that own a certain percentage of a 
benefit corporation’s parent company can initiate these proceedings.83 Unlike 
                                                                                                                           
tion’s articles direct them to do so); LA. STAT. ANN. §12:1821(A)(3) (2016) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 11A, §21.09(a)(3) (same); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a)(3) (same). 
 77 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations 
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 151 n.45 (2012) (criticizing the benefit corporation form 
and arguing that a court would be unlikely to “second guess” a decision that the directors claimed took 
into account non-corporate stakeholders); see also Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1968) (holding that whether “the decision of . . . the directors was a correct one” would be 
“beyond [the court’s] jurisdiction and ability”) (alteration in original). 
 78 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-508 (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 367; TENN. CODE ANN. § 
48-28-108 (2016); see MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 305(c) (requiring 2% stock ownership 
in the benefit corporation or 5% ownership in the benefit corporation’s parent company). 
 79 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 327. 
 80 Strine, supra note 77, at 151 (alteration in original); see A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate 
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932) (“When the fiduciary obliga-
tion of the corporate management and ‘control’ to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the man-
agement and ‘control’ become for all practical purposes absolute.”). 
 81 See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102(a) (requiring third-party certification); id. 
§ 305(c) (providing for a “benefit enforcement proceeding”). At least one commentator has written 
that it is unlikely a shareholder would bring suit against a benefit corporation for its failure to create a 
public benefit. See Reiser, supra note 15, at 240 (arguing that if a benefit corporation’s directors chose 
not to pursue the corporation’s mission, shareholders would fail to hold them accountable and would 
“simply sit back and enjoy the greater returns”). 
 82 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 305(c); see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 14 (2014); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10 (West 2016). 
 83 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 14(b)(2)(iii) (requiring 5% ownership in parent com-
pany to initiate a benefit enforcement proceeding); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b)(2)(c) (same); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(b)(3) (2016) (requiring 10% ownership in parent company); MODEL 
BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 305(c)(2) (requiring shareholders to have 2% ownership of the benefit 
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in derivative actions, monetary damages are not available; the only remedy is 
specific performance, i.e. creation of the corporation’s public benefit.84 One 
commentator has argued that at best, the benefit enforcement proceeding “em-
powers shareholders . . . as eternal nags . . . reduc[ing] the efficiency of corpo-
rate boards,” and at worst, allows shareholders to “greenmail” a corporation by 
demanding larger profit distributions.85 
In addition, a benefit corporation must report, at least annually, on the 
corporation’s efforts to create the public benefit identified in its certificate of 
incorporation, which allows shareholders and the public to judge the corpora-
tion on its humanitarian endeavors.86 Many states, and the Model Legislation, 
require benefit corporations to report on their efforts to create a public benefit 
using a third-party standard.87 The Model Legislation requires that the third-
party certification standard be “comprehensive,” “developed by an entity that 
                                                                                                                           
corporation and investors to have 5% of the parent company to initiate a benefit enforcement proceed-
ing). 
 84 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(f) (West 2012) (establishing that directors cannot face 
monetary liability for the failure to create a public benefit); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 10(d) 
(same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(d) (same); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3321(c)(2) (same); MODEL 
BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(c) (same); Callison, supra note 28, at 95 (noting that the Model 
Legislation exempts directors from monetary liability); Nass, supra note 11, at 887 (noting that bene-
fit enforcement proceedings can only result in specific performance); cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(d) 
(West 2012) (providing that if a court finds that a benefit corporation did not comply with statutory 
requirements, it can award attorney’s fees and other reasonable expenses incurred by a plaintiff in 
bringing a benefit enforcement claim); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78B.190(4) (LexisNexis 2016) 
(same). Specific performance is defined as “a court-ordered remedy that requires precise fulfillment of 
a legal or contractual obligation when monetary damages are inappropriate or inadequate . . . .” Specif-
ic Performance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 85 Callison, supra note 28, at 111 (alteration in original). 
 86 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 15(a); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a) (2016); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a); see also 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11 (2011), http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Vol08_Ch0401-
0429/HRS0420D/HRS_0420D-0011.htm [https://perma.cc/9HD3-4EA4] (requiring benefit corpora-
tions to post their annual benefit report online for a “sixty-day public comment period prior to [its] 
final publication”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(d)(1)–(2) (requiring that benefit corporations file 
their benefit reports with the Department of Treasury, and stating that failure to do so could lead to 
revocation of benefit corporation status); Murray, supra note 7, at 556–57 & n.103 (discussing the 
benefit report requirement and citing state statutes meant to force benefit corporations to publish their 
report). In Florida, for example, if a benefit corporation fails to comply with the benefit report re-
quirements, a court may order the benefit corporation to furnish the report after a shareholder requests 
a copy. FLA. STAT. § 607.613(4) (2016). This is similar to an action under section 220 of the Delaware 
general corporate law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c) (2016) (stating that if a shareholder re-
quests to examine the corporation’s books and records and the corporation refuses, a court may order 
the corporation to fulfill the shareholder’s request).  
 87 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(8) (2016) (defining “third-party certification” as “a 
recognized standard for defining, reporting, and assessing corporate social and environmental perfor-
mance” that is “independent” and “transparent”); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(2) 
(requiring the inclusion of “[a]n assessment of the overall social and environmental performance of 
the benefit corporation against a third-party standard” in the company’s annual reports). 
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is not controlled by the benefit corporation,” “credible,” and “transparent.”88 
Third-party rating agencies are available to perform this task, but the Model 
Legislation does not provide guidance on the specific requirements imposed on 
the agencies.89 Therefore, these agencies can be as stringent, or not, in their 
conceptualization of what it means to actually “create” a public benefit as 
would best serve their needs and the needs of the benefit corporation that pro-
cures their services.90 In addition, third-party standard setters do not have any 
authority to revoke benefit corporation status, nor do they have the power to 
enforce the fiduciary duties of benefit corporation directors.91 
Finally, the Model Legislation requires the appointment of an independent 
“benefit director” whose responsibility is to oversee the board’s creation of a 
public benefit.92 The appointment of a benefit director, however, is only re-
quired in some states.93 In the states that do require a benefit director, this re-
quirement may give rise to professional social enterprise inspectors whose pay 
depends on the substance of their opinions.94 In addition, per the Model Legis-
lation, the benefit director must certify annually that the corporation has acted 
in furtherance of its stated public benefit “in all material respects.”95 It is im-
plausible, however, that every action taken by the corporation’s board would—
or even could—further the creation of the corporation’s public benefit.96 
In sum, consumers and intended beneficiaries, the best evaluators of a 
benefit corporation’s efforts to create a public benefit, are denied standing in 
court, or any viable method outside of the legal system, to enforce the creation 
                                                                                                                           
 88 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (defining “third-party standard”). 
 89 See Callison, supra note 28, at 94 (highlighting the fact that the Model Legislation “spills much 
ink” attempting to define “credible,” “transparent,” and “independent” in the third-party standard, but 
“fails to state how standards are applied or by whom”); Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 845–46 
(noting an array of rating agencies). 
 90 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 238 (noting that the third-party standard setter does not itself 
evaluate a benefit corporation, and instead, a benefit corporation applies the standard itself); see also 
Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1014, 1020–21 (discussing the ambiguity in the word “create,” as used 
by benefit corporation legislation). 
 91 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 238 (explaining that the third-party standard setter has no en-
forcement powers over the creation of a public benefit). 
 92 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 302; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(a) (requiring the 
board of directors of a benefit corporation to include one director who is designated as a “benefit di-
rector”). Some state legislation also includes a “benefit officer,” who is responsible for preparing the 
annual benefit report. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 13; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-9 (allowing 
for, but not requiring, a “benefit officer”). 
 93 Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1024 n.73 (listing the states that do not require benefit direc-
tors). 
 94 Id. at 1019–20. 
 95 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 302(c)(1). 
 96 See Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1024 (noting the impracticality of the “in all material re-
spects” language). 
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of a public benefit, relegating them to judging benefit corporations based on 
scant self-reporting requirements.97 
C. The Oversight and Enforcement Role of State Attorneys General 
State attorneys general play various roles in overseeing charitable organi-
zations and in limited circumstances, can prosecute for-profit corporations.98 
Subsection 1 of this Section describes the two ways in which state attorneys 
general can enforce the activities of nonprofit entities.99 Subsection 2 outlines 
state attorneys general oversight of unfair and deceptive acts or practices.100 
1. State Attorneys General and Charitable Organizations 
Various types of entities qualify as nonprofit charitable organizations.101 
Benefit corporations are simply for-profit corporations and do not currently 
fall under the definition of charitable organization.102 Individuals can create 
charitable trusts by creating a trust and, instead of naming specific beneficiar-
ies, direct the trust to provide a benefit to charitable causes, such as “relief 
from poverty, advancement of education, religion and other purposes benefi-
cial to the community.”103 In addition, similar to the formation of for-profit 
corporations, state laws provide for the formation of nonprofit corporations.104 
The majority of charities are incorporated as nonprofit corporations.105 Non-
profit entities must first be recognized by state law to receive federal tax ex-
emption.106 Nonprofit organizations generally—like benefit corporations—
                                                                                                                           
 97 Cf. id. at 1021 (arguing that beneficiaries are “[p]erhaps the best judges of the effectiveness of 
the corporation’s efforts” to create a public benefit). 
 98 See infra notes 101–116 and accompanying text (providing an overview of state attorney gen-
eral power in this context). 
 99 See infra notes 101–118 and accompanying text. 
 100 See infra notes 119–128 and accompanying text. 
 101 See EDMUND G. BROWN JR., CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDE FOR CHARITIES 2 (2005), 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/charities/publications/guide_for_charities.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GE8S-QGBS] [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES] (describing how 
an organization can qualify as a charity by operating as a nonprofit corporation, charitable trust, or 
unincorporated association). 
 102 Cf. LANE, supra note 54, at 128 (noting that benefit corporations are taxed like ordinary for-
profit corporations). 
 103 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES, supra note 101, at 1. 
 104 Id. at 2 (noting that nonprofit corporations cannot be formed “for the private gain of any per-
son” and must instead operate to promote charitable purposes that benefit the public). 
 105 Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 
41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1124 (2007) (noting that the majority of charities are nonprofit corporations, 
which means that “state law has an enormous impact on the nonprofit sector”). 
 106 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). Section 501(c)(3) lists the types of entities that qualify for tax exemp-
tion. Id. § 501(c)(3). 
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operate for the benefit of an enumerated subset of the public.107 To ensure that 
nonprofit organizations adhere to their missions, however, state attorneys gen-
eral have either statutory or common law authority to initiate court proceedings 
on behalf of the public to enforce nonprofits’ activities.108 
The law governing charities in a few states provides a right of action to 
state attorneys general to initiate proceedings against nonprofit organizations in 
order to prevent harm to the public.109 The rationale behind these statutes is to 
provide recourse for intended beneficiaries who would otherwise have no re-
dress for a nonprofit organization’s misuse of funds dedicated to charity.110 Some 
state attorneys general have been particularly active in prosecuting nonprofit 
organizations.111 California imposed heightened audit and disclosure standards; 
state attorneys general in Massachusetts and Oregon lobbied for legislation to 
require nonprofits to obtain attorney general approval prior to compensating 
their directors; the Oregon attorney general publishes on its website a list of the 
charities with the lowest percentage of contributions going to charitable caus-
es.112 
Where the attorney general lacks statutory authority to enforce the activi-
ties of a nonprofit organization, the common law doctrine of parens patriae 
provides standing for the attorney general to bring suit for harm to the state’s 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES, supra note 101, at 1 (“In common usage, 
the term ‘charity’ refers to an organization that performs charitable programs or sets aside any fund to 
be used for charitable purposes.”). Perhaps the most notable difference between nonprofit organiza-
tions and for-profit corporations is that nonprofit organizations may never distribute profits (other 
than, of course, salaries), whereas a corporation can distribute profits to its shareholders in the form of 
a dividend. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) 
(describing the distribution prohibition in the law governing nonprofits). 
 108 See infra notes 109–116 (describing the role of state attorneys general in regulating charitable 
organizations). 
 109 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (West 1980) (providing the attorney general express power 
to examine the activities of nonprofit organizations and initiate “proceedings necessary to correct . . . 
noncompliance”); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-3-170 (2016) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82.536 (Lex-
isNexis 2016) (same); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 112 (McKinney 2016) (same). 
 110 See Gary W. Herschman & Anjana D. Patel, Attorney General Oversight of Transactions and 
Financial Practices of Nonprofit Corporations, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2010, at 19, 20 (“[A]ttorney general 
oversight is a necessity afforded by the extension of common law charitable trust principles, and is 
often mandated by statute to protect the public interest.”) (emphasis added); ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
GUIDE FOR CHARITIES, supra note 101, at 34 (“[T]he Attorney General represents all the public bene-
ficiaries of charity, who cannot sue in their own right.”). 
 111 See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 70, at 409–10 (discussing oversight of charities in various 
states by states’ attorneys general). 
 112 Id. For further illustration, in early October 2016, the New York attorney general issued a 
“notice of violation” to President-elect Donald J. Trump’s charitable foundation, ordering the founda-
tion to cease soliciting donations in New York because it had failed to properly register in the state. 
Steve Eder, State Attorney General Orders Trump Foundation to Cease Raising Money in New York, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/us/politics/trump-foundation-money.
html [https://perma.cc/8B32-7P6M]. 
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quasi-sovereign interests.113 To bring such an action, the attorney general must 
establish an interest separate from the interests of the private parties directly 
involved in the charity.114 Thus, the attorney general must be able to “allege[] 
injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of [the] population.”115 In 1982, in 
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated that helpful to the determination of whether the state has alleged 
an injury to a significant enough proportion of its population to assert its 
parens patriae powers “is whether the injury is one that the state, if it could, 
would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.”116 
In stark contrast to the role of attorneys general in the sphere of charitable 
organizations, benefit corporation legislation expressly disclaims standing for 
public beneficiaries and includes no powers of state attorney general oversight, 
leaving the job of oversight and enforcement entirely to shareholders.117 In 
                                                                                                                           
 113 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (stat-
ing that “the state must express a quasi-sovereign interest” in order for standing to be conferred); 
Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 16 (1927) (“[J]udicial relief sometimes may be granted to a quasi-
sovereign state under circumstances which would not justify relief if the suit were between private 
parties.”); Renee M. Jones & Michelle Welsh, Toward a Public Enforcement Model for Directors’ 
Duty of Oversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 343, 399–400 (2012) (noting that state attorneys gen-
eral exert enforcement power over charities’ activities through their common law parens patriae pow-
ers). Parens patriae “originated as an English equitable doctrine where the king served as ‘guardian 
for persons legally unable to act for themselves.’” Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Parens 
Patriae Litigation to Redress Societal Damages from the BP Oil Spill: The Latest Stage in the Evolu-
tion of Crimtorts, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 78 (2011) (quoting Stephen Calkins, An En-
forcement Official’s Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 433 (1997)). The 
U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed the doctrine as “the supreme power of every state . . . for the pre-
vention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.” Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890); see Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining parens patriae as “[a] doctrine by which a government has stand-
ing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen”). State attorneys general power to regulate charities 
may not include all charitable organizations. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES, 
supra note 101, at 32 (noting that the California Attorney General has a “very restricted” “oversight 
role with respect to religious corporations”). 
 114 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. According to the Supreme Court, the state may assert a quasi-
sovereign interest in bringing an action in two situations: (1) when the state has an interest in “the 
health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in general,” or (2) when it has an 
“interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system.” Id. (noting 
that “the articulation of such interests is a matter for case-by-case development”). 
 115 Id. (alteration in original) (holding that “[a]lthough more must be alleged than injury to an 
identifiable group of individual residents, the indirect effects of the injury must be considered as 
well”); see also Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a 
state’s “interest that its citizens benefit from voluntary federal grants” is not significant enough an 
interest to provide standing through parens patriae doctrine). 
 116 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. 
 117 See Reiser, supra note 10, at 613 (noting that “[t]here is no regulatory role for any public offi-
cial in the benefit corporation”); cf. Alicia Plerhoples, Will Benefit Corporations Be Considered Char-
ities?, SOCENTLAW (Oct. 26, 2012), http://socentlaw.com/2012/10/will-benefit-corporations-be-
considered-charities [https://perma.cc/ZF9Q-43P9] (posing, but not answering, the question of wheth-
er benefit corporations will be considered charities by state attorneys general). 
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fact, Hawaii’s statute, for example, specifically states that “[e]nforcement of 
those responsibilities [related to creating a public benefit] comes not from gov-
ernmental oversight, but rather from new provisions on transparency and ac-
countability . . . .”118 
2. The Role of State Attorneys General in Enforcing Commercial 
Transactions Through Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices Statutes 
In addition to enforcement and oversight of charities, state attorneys gen-
eral are also granted enforcement power over commercial transactions through 
their states’ unfair or deceptive acts or practices (“UDAP”) statutes.119 There is 
a UDAP statute on the books in every state and the District of Columbia.120 
The statutes typically apply to business transactions between individuals and 
corporations.121 They provide a right of action to individuals and corporations, 
and public enforcement by state attorneys general.122 The statutes also give 
attorneys general the power to scrutinize consumer grievances, enforce com-
pliance with the statutes, move for injunctions or cease and desist orders, and 
obtain recompense for consumers.123 
For comparison, in 2005, the United Kingdom introduced the Community 
Interest Company (“CIC”), which is similar to the benefit corporation, but in-
cludes a specialized Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies 
(“CIC Regulator”) to oversee CICs’ humanitarian efforts.124 The CIC form also 
includes an asset lock, which limits a CIC to distributing thirty-five perfect of 
its profits each year, leaving the remaining profits for humanitarian purpos-
                                                                                                                           
 118 HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-1 (2011), http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Vol08_Ch0401-
0429/HRS0420D/HRS_0420D-0001.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZJB-5UWS] (alteration in original). 
 119 See Anthony Paul Dunbar, Consumer Protection: The Practical Effectiveness of State Decep-
tive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427, 430 (1984) (discussing the role of attorneys 
general in consumer complaints). 
 120 CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE 
STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 3 
(2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PJ4-
R7NP]. 
 121 Michael Flynn, This Is the End . . . My Friend: Disgorgement, Dissolution and Sequestration 
as Remedies Under State UDAP Statutes, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 181, 183 (2008). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Dunbar, supra note 119, at 430. 
 124 See Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal Form for Social Enterprise, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 283, 307 (2012) (describing the CIC form); Reiser, supra note 10, at 613–14 (same); 
What Is a CIC?, CIC ASS’N, http://www.cicassociation.org.uk/about/what-is-a-cic [https://perma.cc/
N38E-J9TL] (same). “A [CIC] is a limited company, with special additional features, created for the 
use of people who want to conduct a business or other activity for community benefit, and not purely 
for private advantage.” Community Interest Companies: Forms and Step-By-Step Guides, OFF. REGU-
LATOR COMMUNITY INT. COMPANIES, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/community-
interest-companies-business-activities [https://perma.cc/WK8M-US92] (alteration in original). 
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es.125 The CIC Regulator determines whether a business organization is eligi-
ble to incorporate or reincorporate as a CIC.126 The CIC Regulator also pro-
vides guidance on the creation of CICs, examines complaints that a CIC has 
drifted from its mission, and can even pursue legal action against a CIC.127 
Since the CIC form was created over ten years ago, about 11,000 CIC’s have 
been incorporated.128 
III. BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION SHOULD INCLUDE MECHANISMS 
FOR STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT 
Benefit corporations, like nonprofit charitable entities, exist to create a 
humanitarian benefit for an enumerated public group, but under current law, it 
is nearly impossible for the public to ensure that a benefit corporation is mak-
ing a good faith effort to create its stated public benefit.129 This Part argues that 
benefit corporation legislation should be amended to provide oversight and 
enforcement mechanisms to state attorneys general to act on behalf of intended 
public beneficiaries.130 Part A contends that attorneys general may already 
have standing under current benefit corporation legislation, but notes the lim-
                                                                                                                           
 125 See OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST COS., INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE 
NOTES: CHAPTER 6: THE ASSET LOCK 5, 7 (2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/416360/14-1089-community-interest-companies-chapter-6-the-asset-
lock.pdf [https://perma.cc/MFR7-8X7V] [hereinafter THE ASSET LOCK]; Sam Burne James, Analysis: 
The Rise and Rise of Community Interest Companies, THIRD SECTOR (June 1, 2015), http://www.third
sector.co.uk/analysis-rise-rise-community-interest-companies/governance/article/1348096 [https://
perma.cc/47XR-4C64]. 
 126 Community Interest Companies, OFF. REGULATOR COMMUNITY INT. COMPANIES, https://
www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-the-regulator-of-community-interest-companies 
[https://perma.cc/HHK3-MUW4] [hereinafter Community Interest Companies]. One of the architects 
of the CIC legislation, Stephen Lloyd, has said that the CIC Regulator’s powers are “surprisingly 
wide.” Stephen Lloyd, Transcript: Creating the CIC, 35 VT. L. REV. 31, 38 (2010). The CIC Regula-
tor can hire forensic accountants to investigate a CIC’s books; she has the authority to initiate civil 
proceedings against CIC’s; she can also remove the directors and appoint a CIC receiver, who in turn, 
can initiate the dissolution or liquidation of the CIC. See id. at 38–39 (describing the powers of the 
CIC Regulator). 
 127 Community Interest Companies, supra note 126. CIC’s may pay dividends to private investors 
but the distributions are subject to an aggregate maximum cap of 35%. See THE ASSET LOCK, supra 
note 125, at 5, 7 (explaining recent updates to the dividend distribution cap). In addition, upon disso-
lution or liquidation, assets must either be transferred to a fully charitable organization, another CIC, 
or distributed towards the community benefit enumerated in the company’s organizing documents. Id. 
at 3; cf. Murray, supra note 27, at 507–08 (arguing that benefit corporation legislation should include 
an asset lock provision). 
 128 James, supra note 125. 
 129 See Khatib, supra note 9, at 181–82 (arguing that the current legislative framework leaves an 
“enormous potential” for “legalized greenwashing”); Nass, supra note 11, at 888 (recommending 
changes to benefit corporation legislation such as “creating a more structured third-party oversight and 
transparency standard and expanding the scope of stakeholders that may bring a benefit enforcement 
proceeding”). 
 130 See infra notes 133–174 and accompanying text. 
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ited and uncertain applicability of such an approach.131 Part B advocates for 
amending the legislation to include a statutory grant of authority to attorneys 
general to oversee and enforce the creation of public benefits; similar to the 
United Kingdom’s CIC Regulator discussed in Part II.132 
A. The Possibility for State Attorney General Oversight Under Existing 
Benefit Corporation Legislation 
State attorneys general may find that their interest in protecting the public 
from sham nonprofit organizations places public benefit creation enforcement 
within their existing enforcement powers.133 As previously noted, benefit cor-
poration legislation specifically denies standing to intended beneficiaries, so 
that they cannot sue on their own behalf to enforce the creation of a public 
benefit.134 Because benefit corporation legislation denies standing to intended 
beneficiaries, attorneys general may view this as a public policy reason to as-
sert their oversight powers.135 
Where attorneys general have statutory authority with regard to nonprofit 
organizations, a colorable argument could be made that such statutory authori-
ty also confers on attorneys general the power to enforce the public benefit 
activities of benefit corporations.136 In the alternative, attorneys general may 
                                                                                                                           
 131 See infra notes 133–145 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 149–174 and accompanying text. 
 133 Reiser, supra note 15, at 242 (explaining that attorneys generals’ “interest in protecting the 
public interest in their jurisdictions” might force them to consider enforcing the creation of public 
benefits by benefit corporations); John Tyler, Analyzing Effects and Implications of Regulating Chari-
table Hybrid Forms as Charitable Trusts: Round Peg and a Square Hole?, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 535, 
559 & n.69 (2013) (noting the possibility that attorney general authority to police benefit corporations 
could be found in existing charitable trust law). But see Murray & Hwang, supra note 31, at 38 (argu-
ing that attorneys general lack the same interest in “ensuring proper management” of benefit corpora-
tions as shareholders). 
 134 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting that benefit corporation legislation denies 
standing to intended beneficiaries). 
 135 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 240 (discussing whether attorneys general will view public bene-
fit creation enforcement “as part of their mandate”). 
 136 See id. at 241 (suggesting that if some or all of a social purpose corporation’s assets are devot-
ed to charitable purposes, it could fall within the reach of the statutory powers of attorneys general). 
Similarly, if a benefit corporation can be considered a charity, there is also the possibility that a court 
could rewrite the public benefit goal in a benefit corporation’s certificate of incorporation under the cy 
pres doctrine, in order to avoid frustration of the public benefit goal. See Sean W. Brownridge, Can-
ning Plum Organics: The Avant-Garde Campbell Soup Company Acquisition and Delaware Public 
Benefit Corporations Wandering Revlon-Land, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 703, 736 (2015) (arguing that “cy 
pres precedent functions as a foundation for Delaware courts to recognize the preservation and protec-
tion of social missions at organizations appreciably concerned with the production of public value”); 
Tyler, supra note 133, at 555 (explaining that courts may refine a benefit corporation’s mission 
through the cy pres doctrine). Cy pres is an “equitable doctrine under which a court reforms a written 
instrument with a gift to charity as closely to the donor’s intention as possible, so that the gift does not 
fail.” Cy Pres, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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be able to enforce benefit corporations’ activities through common law power 
if the failure to pursue or create a public benefit harms the public.137 A state 
attorney general must allege harm to a significant enough population in order 
to bring an action under her common law power.138 Thus, if a company’s pub-
lic benefit language is written in such a way as to make it possible to establish 
an identifiable group of beneficiaries, a suit brought by the attorney general on 
behalf of that group seems plausible.139 
Benefit corporations do not, however, hold funds “dedicated irrevocably 
to charitable purposes.”140 As such, state attorney general enforcement of the 
creation of public benefits under existing law would require a loose interpreta-
tion of the concept of charitable purpose.141 In addition, benefit corporations 
are taxed as ordinary corporations and cannot qualify for treatment as tax-
exempt charitable organizations under the Internal Revenue Code.142 Finally, 
the benefit corporation standard does not mandate that a benefit corporation 
donate to charitable causes.143 A benefit corporation can satisfy the statutory 
criteria by pledging to carry on its business for the benefit of “employees, sup-
pliers, customers, creditors,” or the public more generally by, for example, 
committing to operating in an environmentally friendly manner.144 State actors 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Robert H. Lande, New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the 
Real Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61 ALA. L. REV. 447, 462 (2010) (noting that state attorneys 
general in many states “have parens patriae authority to sue generally on behalf of victimized con-
sumers within their states”). 
 138 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (stat-
ing that attorneys general must be more than a “nominal party” to bring suit through use of parens 
patriae power); Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that “the 
Supreme Court has disapproved of considering abstract questions of wide public significance amount-
ing to generalized grievances”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 139 See Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 167 (1883) (holding that a public charitable trust “must[] 
be for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons; for if all the beneficiaries are personally desig-
nated, the trust lacks the essential element of indefiniteness, which is one characteristic of a legal 
charity”). This possibility may incentivize corporations to craft the language of their stated public 
benefit in generalized terms so as to insulate themselves from liability to intended beneficiaries. See 
Briana Cummings, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote the Public Interest, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 609 (2012) (arguing that “those targeted by a corporation’s ‘specific public 
benefit’ arguably have a greater moral claim than do those not directly targeted”); Loewenstein, supra 
note 38, at 1023 (arguing that the “expressed specific public benefit [may be] so narrowly drawn that 
its beneficiaries are limited and identifiable”) (alteration in original). 
140 Reiser, supra note 15, at 241. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (stating the requirements to be classified as a charitable 
organization); LANE, supra note 54, at 128 (noting that benefit corporations are taxed in the same 
manner as any other for-profit corporation); Benefit Corp FAQ’s, supra note 15 (stating that benefit 
corporations are taxed as C or S corps); see also Charitable Organization, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY (10th ed. 2014) (noting that a charitable organization is tax-exempt). 
 143 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 241 (noting that benefit corporations are unlikely to be consid-
ered charities). 
 144 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(B) (West 2015); cf. Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 842 
(noting that if a benefit corporation “consciously conducts its operations in a manner that is socially 
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likely would not view such a mission, though sufficient for qualification as a 
benefit corporation, as charitable for the purposes of state law governing chari-
table organizations.145 
B. Possibilities for Legislative Change 
Given the uncertainty under current legislation as to whether state attorneys 
general have statutory or common law power to enforce benefit corporations, 
certain amendments should be made to the legislation.146 Subsection 1 discusses 
the effect that explicitly classifying benefit corporations and their fiduciaries as 
“trustees” of assets held for charitable purposes would have on attorney general 
enforcement capabilities.147 Subsection 2 urges states to amend their benefit cor-
poration legislation to include procedures for attorney general enforcement and 
oversight similar to the United Kingdom’s CIC form.148 
1. Statutory Classification of Benefit Corporation Fiduciaries as “Trustees” 
Professor Brakeman Reiser has argued that statutory classification of ben-
efit corporation fiduciaries as “trustees” of charitable assets would provide an 
indirect avenue for attorneys general to oversee and enforce benefit corpora-
tions’ charitable activities.149 For example, fiduciaries of Illinois Low-Profit 
Limited Liability Corporations (“L3Cs”) are classified as trustees of charitable 
assets and are thus subject to Illinois charitable trust law.150 If this classifica-
tion were included in benefit corporation legislation, attorneys general would 
be able to use their statutory power to hold directors of benefit corporations 
accountable for a failure to diligently oversee the management and use of char-
                                                                                                                           
and environmentally responsible, it would qualify as a benefit corporation regardless of whether it 
also contributes to or promotes charitable causes”). 
 145 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 241 (noting that such purposes are unlikely to be viewed as 
“charitable under state law”). 
 146 See Nass, supra note 11, at 888 (“If legislatures augment certain provisions in the benefit 
corporation legislation and courts strictly enforce compliance, incorporating as a benefit corporation 
will allow such a corporation to demonstrate that it is truly committed to social and environmental 
progress.”). 
 147 See infra notes 149–153 and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra notes 154–174 and accompanying text. 
 149 Reiser, supra note 15, at 241 (noting that it is unclear whether benefit corporations are trustees 
of assets dedicated to charitable purposes). 
 150 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(d) (2014). L3Cs are for-profit businesses, some of whose 
profits are directed to charitable foundations. See id. (stating that Illinois L3C’s are trustees of charita-
ble assets and are thus subject to Illinois charitable trust law with respect to fiduciary duties); 805 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. § 40/4.01(d) (2014) (stating that “[a] [benefit corporation] director does not have a duty 
to a person that is a beneficiary of the general public benefit purpose or a specific public benefit pur-
pose of a benefit corporation arising from the status of the person as a beneficiary”) (alteration in 
original); see also supra note 54 (describing the L3C form). 
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itable assets.151 This does not fully resolve the issue, however, because if bene-
fit corporations are to retain their hybrid for-profit status, not all of a benefit 
corporation’s assets can be devoted to charitable purposes.152 By choosing not 
to dedicate any funds to charity and qualifying as a benefit corporation through 
another mechanism, benefit corporations could easily manipulate the law in 
order to shield directors from liability.153 
2. Benefit Corporation Legislation Should Be Amended to Expressly 
Include Attorney General Enforcement Power 
Instead of providing indirect enforcement capabilities to attorneys gen-
eral, as described in the previous Subsection, benefit corporation legislation 
should be amended to specifically provide attorneys general with oversight and 
enforcement power over benefit corporations.154 The United Kingdom’s CIC 
form, and the already existing statutory grants of authority to state attorneys 
general to oversee and enforce charities, could be reference points for drafting 
the addition of attorney general oversight and enforcement into benefit corpo-
ration legislation.155 Given that attorneys general already have broad enforce-
ment capabilities with regard to charitable enterprises, the regulation and en-
forcement of benefit corporations would be consonant to their current duties.156 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(d) (stating that L3C directors are subject to charitable 
trust law). 
 152 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 241 (noting that not all assets of benefit corporations are devoted 
entirely to charity); Nass, supra note 11, at 881 (noting that benefit corporations “hope to achieve the 
dual-purposes of profit maximization and the furtherance of a material public benefit”). 
 153 See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 842 (noting that by committing to social and environ-
mental responsibility, an entity can qualify as a benefit corporation regardless of whether it donates to 
charity); cf. Khatib, supra note 9, at 182 (noting that “[a]s it currently stands, neither the [Model Leg-
islation] nor [Delaware’s benefit corporation] legislation contains a mechanism to investigate exploi-
tation of the corporate form”) (alteration in original). Upon incorporation, founders could include in 
the certificate of incorporation that the corporation exists not to donate to charitable causes, but in-
stead, is committed to operating in a socially and environmentally-responsible manner. See Reiser, 
supra note 15, at 241 (noting that such broad purposes are unlikely to be charitable under state law); 
see also Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1007–08 (noting that a benefit corporation could, for example, 
“opt to power the corporation’s factory or offices with renewable sources of energy, even it [sic] the 
cost exceeded that of a carbon-based fuel”). 
 154 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 243 (noting the possibility that states could include attorney gen-
eral oversight in their benefit corporation legislation); see also Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1021–
22 (proposing the inclusion of attorney general oversight in benefit corporation legislation); Nass, 
supra note 11, at 890 (arguing for government oversight in benefit corporation legislation). But see 
Murray, Chose Your Own Master, supra note 5, at 45 (arguing that “[p]rivate organizations are better 
equipped than state governments to build nuanced brands and to police them”). 
 155 See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text (describing the CIC form). 
 156 See Jones & Welsh, supra note 113, at 400 (arguing that “[e]xtending authority to cover direc-
tors of for-profit corporations could thus be seen as a natural extension of the attorney general’s exist-
ing powers”). 
2016] Benefit Corporations and Accountability to Intended Beneficiaries 1777 
State attorneys general have common law power in all states and express 
statutory authority in some states to intervene in the management and affairs of 
a charitable organization in order to correct a departure from the purpose for 
which it was formed.157 Thus, attorneys general have particular experience in 
assessing performance of the fiduciary duties in charitable trust law.158 As 
such, benefit corporation legislation could be amended to include similar 
grants of authority to attorneys general.159 Similarly, abandonment of a benefit 
corporation’s humanitarian purpose or perversion of the corporate form to at-
tract consumers may harm the public, enabling attorneys general to take action 
under UDAP provisions.160 
Massachusetts and New Jersey require that a benefit corporation’s annual 
benefit report be filed with the state authority.161 New Jersey law also states 
that if a corporation has not delivered its report for two consecutive years, the 
state can revoke its legal status as a benefit corporation.162 These reporting re-
quirements indicate that state legislatures have already given some thought to 
the possibility of sham benefit corporations, and have taken small steps to in-
tegrate state oversight into the legislation.163 In addition, passage of constitu-
                                                                                                                           
 157 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (West 1980) (granting the attorney general authority to 
enforce the activities of nonprofit charitable organizations); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 14.251 (West 
2016) (providing that the attorney general “shall represent the people” in overseeing the activities of 
charitable trusts); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (noting that a 
suit to enforce the activities of a charitable trust is normally brought by the Attorney General); 
BOGERT ET AL., supra note 70, § 363 (noting that a fulfillment of the objectives of a charitable trust is 
almost always enforced by the attorney general). Courts have, however, indicated a tendency to defer 
to nonprofit directors, much like the business judgment rule in suits regarding for-profit companies. 
See, e.g., In re Multiple Sclerosis Serv. Org. of N.Y., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 861, 865, 868 (N.Y. 1986) 
(holding that directors of a nonprofit had the authority to define the organization’s mission and were 
not bound by the language of its founding documents). 
 158 Reiser, supra note 15, at 243 (noting the expertise of attorneys general in regulating charitable 
enterprises); see Brody, supra note 70, at 947 (noting that attorneys general have had “successes in 
educating the public about fraudulent fund raising and challenging wrongdoing, educating fiduciaries 
and staffs in meeting their legal obligations and improving charity governance, rectifying self-dealing 
and other breaches of fiduciary duty by charity insiders, and assisting charities that have lost their way 
to restructure or dissolve”). 
 159 See Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1021–22 (noting that benefit corporation legislation could 
include attorney general oversight enforcement of public benefit creation); Reiser, supra note 15, at 
240 (discussing the addition of attorney general oversight in benefit corporation legislation). 
 160 Reiser, supra note 15, at 242 (explaining that the concern of the state attorneys general “in 
protecting the public interest in their jurisdictions” might force them to consider enforcing benefit 
corporations’ creation of public benefits). But see Murray & Hwang, supra note 31, at 38 (arguing that 
attorneys general lack the same interest in “ensuring proper management” of benefit corporations as 
shareholders). 
 161 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 16(d) (2014) (requiring a benefit corporation to submit its 
annual report to the state secretary); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(d)(1) (West 2016) (same). 
 162 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(d)(2) (stating that New Jersey can revoke benefit corpora-
tion status after a two-year failure to deliver the benefit report). 
 163 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 243 (arguing that stricter disclosure requirements may help alert 
state authorities to disingenuous benefit corporations). But see Cummings, supra note 139, at 612 
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ency statutes indicates that states have recognized that corporations owe some 
degree of duty to public stakeholders.164 
States should use the United Kingdom’s CIC Regulator as an example 
when drafting attorney general enforcement into their benefit corporation leg-
islation.165 The CIC legislation includes the appointment of a CIC Regulator, 
who has a wide array of oversight and enforcement capabilities.166 In particu-
lar, the CIC Regulator can investigate a CIC’s books, initiate civil proceedings 
against CIC’s, and expel directors.167 Similarly, within state attorneys general 
offices, there is generally a division devoted to investigating and bringing 
claims against corporations for unfair and deceptive acts or practices.168 In ad-
dition, attorneys general, compared to a separate, independent commission, 
have greater incentive to protect the public from deceptive business practices 
and are less susceptible to collusion with benefit corporations themselves.169 
To further borrow from the CIC Regulator, an important step would be to 
require pre-approval from attorneys general before entrepreneurs could incor-
porate new corporations or reincorporate existing corporations as benefit cor-
porations.170 This initial check on benefit corporations would serve to dissuade 
                                                                                                                           
(arguing that external reporting requirements encourage firms to “suppress information, focus on 
short-term results, and do the minimum necessary to comply with external requirements”). In addi-
tion, at the state level, there is at least some evidence of the recognition of the possible overlap be-
tween benefit corporation law and the law governing charitable trusts. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700 
(West 2015) (noting that nothing in California’s benefit corporation statute “shall be construed as 
negating existing charitable trust principles or the Attorney General’s authority to enforce any charita-
ble trust created”). 
 164 See Jones & Welsh, supra note 113, at 400 (noting that passage of constituency statutes indi-
cate a “public conception of the corporation” that would support the addition of attorney general over-
sight). Constituency statutes allow directors to consider non-financial stakeholders in their decision 
making but, unlike benefit corporation statutes, do not mandate that directors do so. See supra note 67 
(discussing constituency statutes). 
 165 See White, supra note 33, at 351 (arguing for the creation of a “Benefit Corporation Commis-
sion,” but advocating against inclusion of attorney general oversight); OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF 
CMTY. INTEREST COS., LEAFLETS: STATUS, ROLE, FUNCTION AND LOCATION 4 (2013), https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/223957/13-785-community-interest-
companies-regulators-status-role-function-and-location-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL56-ZTSN] 
[hereinafter LEAFLETS] (discussing the role of the CIC Regulator in overseeing the activities of 
CIC’s); supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text (discussing the CIC form). 
 166 See Lloyd, supra note 126, at 38–39 (describing the duties of the CIC Regulator). 
 167 Id.; see LEAFLETS, supra note 165, at 3, 5 (defining the CIC Regulator as “an independent 
statutory office-holder appointed by the Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills”). 
 168 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 242 (stating that “[p]rotecting investors and consumers from 
fraudulent and deceptive practices is another important part of the mandate of state attorneys gen-
eral”); supra notes 119–123 and accompanying text (describing the role of state attorneys general in 
policing unfair and deceptive acts or practices). 
 169 Cf. Loewenstein, supra note 38, at 1024–25 (discussing the fact that third-party rating agen-
cies are susceptible to influence by benefit corporations). 
 170 See LEAFLETS, supra note 165, at 4 (noting that the CIC Regulator assess applications from 
companies looking to become CIC’s). 
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“bad actors” from incorporating disingenuous benefit corporations.171 In addi-
tion to requiring pre-incorporation approval, states should also follow the ex-
amples of Massachusetts and New Jersey and require that the annual benefit 
report be submitted to the state.172 Combining these two mechanisms would 
provide an initial check on corporate purpose and a subsequent check to ensure 
that approved benefit corporations do not engage in “greenwashing” or deviate 
from their stated purpose.173 It is unlikely that genuine social enterprise entre-
preneurs would resist these changes because additional reporting requirements 
would dissuade sham companies from choosing the benefit corporation form 
and would allow the truly socially and environmentally conscious companies 
to further differentiate themselves in the marketplace.174 
CONCLUSION 
By merging the formerly binary distinction between for-profit and non-
profit corporations, the benefit corporation represents a divergence from tradi-
tional concepts of corporate law. This new corporate form promotes the use of 
for-profit entities for positive, progressive, social, and environmental benefit. 
The current legislation, however, lacks viable, robust accountability mecha-
nisms necessary to make the benefit corporation a worthwhile contribution to 
corporate law. States should amend their benefit corporation legislation to in-
clude enforcement and oversight by state attorneys general in order to correct 
the lack of accountability and enforcement mechanisms of the current legisla-
tion. State attorneys general are well suited to create an office of benefit corpo-
ration enforcement by blending the existing duties of charitable enforcement 
and policing unfair and deceptive acts or practices. As such, attorney general 
enforcement of benefit corporations would supplement current duties and 
would greatly improve the protections against the incorporation of sham bene- 
  
                                                                                                                           
 171 Cf. Reiser, supra note 15, at 243 (noting that additional disclosure requirements may deter 
“bad actors”). 
 172 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 16(d) (requiring a benefit corporation to submit its annual 
report to the state secretary); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-11(d)(1), (2) (requiring the same and stating 
that the state can revoke benefit corporation status after a two-year failure to deliver the report). 
 173 See Murray, supra note 27, at 508 (discussing “mission-drift,” which is when an organization 
departs from its original purpose); Plerhoples, supra note 44, at 258 (same); supra notes 41–53 and 
accompanying text (discussing “greenwashing”). 
 174 See Reiser, supra note 15, at 243 (arguing that added requirements would dissuade “bad ac-
tors” from forming sham benefit corporations); Ribstein, supra note 48, at 1453 (discussing how 
companies can differentiate their products to attract socially conscious consumers); cf. Benefit Corpo-
ration White Paper, supra note 9, at 1104 (arguing that third-party standard setters reduce the likeli-
hood for success of nominal benefit corporations). 
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fit corporations. Benefit corporations serve laudable, humanitarian purposes. 
Effective accountability and enforcement mechanisms through state attorneys 
general would serve to better promote and sustain those purposes. 
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